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7.1  The Context: Industrial Relations and Collective 
Bargaining in Italy
7.1.1  The Main Characteristics of Collective  
Bargaining in Italy
Italian industrial relations are characterized by a low degree of ‘legal institution-
alization’ (Baglioni 1998; Cella 2009; Napoli 1998). Legislations and the state 
have a limited role in the regulation of collective bargaining, conflict and union 
representation.
Italian industrial relations have been poorly institutionalized, and not suffi-
ciently mature when compared with those of other European countries. For a long 
time, the perception was that the main problem has to do with the Italian unions’ 
militancy and political divisions and with their unwillingness to compromise on a 
much-needed policy of centralized wage moderation. The absence of a clear set of 
agreed-upon rules has also been frequently singled out as a significant factor. The 
failure of national agreements in the early 1980s, and the decentralization of collec-
tive bargaining which ensued, provided empirical support for these critical views.
In the early 1990s the situation of Italian employment relations changed dramati-
cally. In1993, the architecture of collective bargaining was thoroughly reformed 
and the links across bargaining levels became much more rational and institutional-
ized than they had ever been.
The tripartite agreement Protocol of July 23rd, 1993, represents a kind of 
‘constitutional charter for industrial relations’, a so-called ‘basic agreement’ 
(Alacevich 1996; Cella and Treu 2009), which formed the basis for subsequent ac-
cords. It established a new institutional framework for income policies, bargaining 
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structures and procedures, worker/union representation, employment policies and 
measures to support the production system.
The Protocol defined a two-tier bargaining structure, setting out that collective 
bargaining can legitimately take place at national-sectorial level and at company 
level. Alternatively, bargaining can take place at territorial level to cover a particular 
district, province or region.
The relationship between the two levels is based on the fundamental principles 
of (a) coordination, (b) specialization (avoiding overlap), and (c) derogation (only 
for the workers).
According to these principles, the national-sectorial level establishes minimum 
rights and standards for the whole workforce, giving social partners the ability to 
improve them through a second level of collective bargaining. The articulated sys-
tem provides a controlled and coordinated decentralization. The national-sectorial 
level determines the modes and spheres of action of the second level of bargaining. 
Sector-based agreements are entrusted with establishing the issues with which de-
centralized bargaining is allowed to deal.
As in other European countries, the Italian collective bargaining system has 
come under pressure in recent years. There are increasing calls for greater decen-
tralization, including wage setting, in order to meet companies’ competitive needs 
and to allow companies to overcome temporary economic difficulties. Moreover, 
according to many scholars, the introduction of an efficient system of second-level 
bargaining could increase labor productivity, which is particularly low—and declin-
ing—in Italian firms.
This increasing pressure has led to a tripartite agreement partly reviewing the 
norms of the Protocol of 1993. In 2009 a number of employer associations, in-
cluding the General Confederation of Italian Industry (Confindustria), the Italian 
Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions (CISL) and the Union of Italian Workers 
(UIL) signed the Framework Agreement for the Reform of the Collective Bargain-
ing System (FARCB)1.
The most important changes compared with the system established by the 1993 
agreement are:
• Industry agreements now run for 3 years, covering both pay and conditions, rath-
er than the two years for pay and 4 years for conditions, as set out in the 1993 
framework;
• Pay increases in industry agreements are no longer linked to the forecast infla-
tion rate, but to the forecast European consumer price index for Italy, excluding 
energy consumption. Any differences between the forecast and actual inflation 
should be made up for within the 3-year period of the agreement. Productivity 
improvements are now only to be taken account of in company level bargaining, 
which the government is encouraging through tax incentives. Where there is no 
company-level bargaining, employees should receive extra payments through a 
wage guarantee element (EGR -elemento di garanzia retributive), to be agreed 
jointly by the two sides, and paid at the end of the three year period.
1 Accordo quadro: Riforma degli assetti contrattuali, 22 gennaio 2009
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• The negotiating timetable has been changed: the unions must submit their claim 
six months before the end of the agreement and the employers must respond 
within 20 days; strikes are prohibited during the last six months of an agreement 
and in the month after it runs out.
The General Confederation of Italian Workers (CGIL) refused to sign the agree-
ment, and campaigned against the change. CGIL’s major criticism was related to 
the protection against inflation, which was seen as less than that provided by the 
1993 agreement, as well as the fear that the new arrangements would undercut in-
dustry-level deals. The text of the agreement signed in April 2009 makes it clear 
that the greater decentralization of bargaining is seen as a mechanism to “re-launch 
a growth in productivity and therefore of real incomes.”
In 2011 the relations among the main trade unions confederations appeared to be 
improved by an agreement that all of them signed in June 20112. This set out clear 
rules for company-level agreements, of which the “development and extension” 
were seen as “a common objective” of all the signatory parties. These company-
level agreements can “set out specific terms modifying the regulations contained in 
the national collective agreements, within the limits and in line with the procedure 
that the national company agreements themselves permit”, as stated in the text of 
June 2011. In other words, the terms of the industry agreement reached at national 
level can be improved or worsened provided that this possibility has been allowed 
for in the industry-level agreement itself. The general framework also laid down the 
rules on how company-level agreements are to be approved.
The agreement, thus, marks a very important step forward as it (a) retrieves 
the unity of the trade union, (b) strengthens second-level bargaining as a factor of 
competitiveness based on the enhancement of work, and (c) underpins workers’ 
protection.
7.1.2  Historical Development of Industrial Relations
Since the second post-war evolution, the system of industrial relations and col-
lective bargaining in Italy has been closely linked to the evolution of the political 
system. In the past, the three major trade union confederations had a clear political 
affiliation. The Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) was very close 
to the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei 
Lavoratori (CISL), created by trade unionists of Catholic inspiration, was very close 
to the Christian Democrats (DC), and the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL) was 
closer to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Starting in the nineties with the disappear-
ance of the parties’ reference, this categorization is no longer appropriate, although 
cultural references of origins are still valid. The weakening of the link between trade 
unions and political parties has contributed greatly to the overall reorganization of 
the Italian political system, particularly since the nineties.
2 Accordo confederale fra Confindustria e CGIL, CISl and UIL 28th June 2011 
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In the fifties, collective bargaining was characterized by centralization, due to 
(a) the interest of the employers’ association to tie the labor costs of the most dy-
namic sectors to that of backward sectors, such as agriculture; (b) the lack of trade 
union structures necessary for decentralized bargaining, because employee repre-
sentation at company level was absent and, when present, ineffective; and (c) CGIL 
looked at the development of decentralized bargaining with suspicion, fearing that 
decentralized structures had been able to create company unions or would become 
too independent and this would jeopardize the representation of the working class 
by the Communist Party (Cella 1976).
The sixties were the period of the "economic boom" and major changes in the 
political framework and industrial relations. The consolidation of the Fordism 
model of production in large enterprises pushed the unions to pay more attention 
to the negotiation of working conditions at the company level. The contractual dy-
namic accelerated, in particular the sectorial and industry bargaining, driven by 
labor market conditions in favor of the trade unions initiative (Cella and Treu 2009). 
Company-level bargaining was recognized and institutionalized. It was reserved 
for the competence to deal with the same matters of national contract. The two-
tier bargaining structure, national and company level, were connected through a 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes. The number of company supplementary 
agreements increased enormously, regulating a wide range of themes and innova-
tive institutions which then extended to the national level. To give some examples, 
the regional pay scales were abolished and equal wage increases were developed for 
everyone, improvements of the workplace health and safety conditions, and reduc-
ing the pace and duration of work time.
The centrist political framework which dominated the fifties, lost its power. The 
country changed; the policy framework needed to be broader, especially in order to 
answer the questions emerging from the world of work. The political framework 
opened to the left, the Socialists entered the area of government, after becoming 
independent from the Communist Party. It opened the era of the center-left and, 
despite its limitations, it marked an important political, cultural and social progress. 
This indicated the first attempts to plan the lines of an economic policy, towards 
which the CISL showed interest, because they believed that the union shouldn’t 
limit itself to the distribution of income, but also should intervene in the processes 
of accumulation, savings, investment and development of consumption.
The late sixties and early seventies were characterized by strong changes in labor 
relations. In the fall of 1969, massive labor struggles took place in the factories, 
ushering a period of violent conflict, later known as the "hot autumn". The great 
union mobilization was determined by the expiration of labor contracts, especially 
for the category of metalworkers. In this period, the workers’ movement were allied 
to the student protests, who claimed a generalized "right for education" for all so-
cial strata. The combined action of the students and workers’ movement pushed 
trade unions to take the lead of the protest movement. In many industrial plants, 
particularly in the metalworking industry, the three trade union confederations were 
forced to join. In 1972, the three major confederations came together establishing 
the United Federation (CGIL, CISL and UIL). The United Federation didn’t replace 
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the old trade unions, but created a closer connection among them through various 
coordination structures (Lange and Vannicelli 1982).
With the eighties came the triumph of the free market, the predominance of eco-
nomic policies inspired by neoliberalism, with its greatest champions in the gov-
ernments of Ronald Reagan in the United States, Mrs. Thatcher in Britain, and the 
emergence of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), after the passage of the Communist 
Party (PCI) to the opposition. This meant the destruction of social protections and 
marginalization of trade unions. In Italy, on the economic level, the scene was 
dominated by inflation above 20 %, with a heavy international recession and the 
consequent huge increase of unemployment. Companies restructured and renewed 
themselves at an accelerated pace, there was a growing surplus of labor, and wage 
guarantee fund became a welfare monster resources’ consumer. Under increasing 
pressure of the political parties, the margins of unions autonomy were reduced and 
in 1984 a vertical split of the United Federation produced two main unions move-
ment, on the one hand the communist component, and on the other hand, CISL, UIL 
and the socialist component of the CGIL.
In this scenario, three large tripartite agreements were signed. The first one was 
signed in 1983 with the goal to reduce inflation through a cooling of the wages’ 
dynamic, induced by wage indexation. The second one was signed in 1984 with the 
lack of unitary agreement on partial sterilization of the wage indexation. It marked 
a profound change of scenery, culminating in the referendum for the abrogation 
of the wage indexation in 1985 with a successful result. After 1985 a new phase 
in industrial relations opened, which found its culmination in mid- nineties with 
the tripartite agreement of July 1993. It institutionalized a new framework for the 
contractual structure: change the bargaining procedures and workers representation 
in the workplace, employment policies and measures to support the production. 
This agreement can be seen as the first effort to create a systematic structure for the 
workers representation and collective bargaining.
In the early 2000s there was an unsuccessful attempt to reform collective bar-
gaining (Cella and Treu 2009). CISL and UIL asked for a structural reform to give 
more space for company and territorial decentralized bargaining, which should 
facilitate the recovery of wage dynamics. CGIL, instead, continued to sustain the 
importance of national bargaining. The tensions lead to the rupture related to the 
signing of the agreement with the government on the labor market in 2002 (Pact for 
Italy). Concerns about the adjustment of the wages to inflation did not seem to be 
shared by the center-right government (second Berlusconi government). In 2007 the 
center-left government (second Prodi government) takes the business of promot-
ing consultation, government and trade unions will come to a trilateral agreement 
relating to the welfare, the labor market and pensions. The agreement was harshly 
criticized by some unions, particularly from Italian workers Metalworkers’ Federa-
tion (FIOM) affiliated to the CGIL. In 2009, the government and the social partners, 
with the exception of the CGIL, signed an agreement for the reform of collective 
bargaining.
At the end of 2011 and the first half of 2012 two major reforms in the pension 
system and the labor market were introduced. Neither of the two were negotiated 
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with the social partners. The pension reform was included in the first measures 
taken by the Government Monti in early December 2011. It was defined unilater-
ally by the government and harshly criticized by the three main trade unions. With 
regard to the reform of the labor market, there have been some discussions with 
the social partners, but no agreement was reached prior to the submission of the 
measure to parliament. Some elements of the reform were discussed with the social 
partners only after submitting the reform in parliament. However, there was no 
wide-ranging negotiation, as in the 90s.
7.1.3  Workplace Representation
The Workers’ Statute of 1970 gives the workers the right to organize a plant-level 
union representation structure (Rappresentanza sindacale aziendale, RSA). The 
tripartite agreement of July 1993 introduced—in addition to the RSA—a so-called 
unitary workplace union structure (Rappresentanza sindacale unitaria, RSU). This 
body is elected by all employees, but representatives are usually elected through 
trade union lists. Therefore, it includes features of both works councils (the broad 
active electorate) and trade union bodies (almost exclusive inclusion of trade union 
representatives). In general, it can be associated with trade union bodies. The estab-
lishment of RSUs confirms the traditional system of single-channel representation 
in Italy, whereby union and employee representation are entrusted to a single body, 
as opposed to dual-channel systems where union delegates operate alongside works 
councils.
An RSU can be set up when there are more than 15 employees in the workplace. 
The national level agreements for the private and public sectors provide minimum 
numbers (3 members until 200 employees and 6 until 500 employees and then 3 
more members every 300 additional employee) but these can be improved in indus-
try and company agreements.
Two-thirds of the representatives in the RSU are elected by the workforce (both 
union and non-union members); one-third of the positions are reserved for the trade 
union organizations affiliated to the signatory organizations of the sectorial national 
collective agreement (Contratto Collettivo Nazionale di Lavoro, CCNL) applied in 
the company. RSUs, when present, have all of the rights attributed to RSAs by law 
or collective agreements (1970 Workers’ Statute rights, as well as rights regarding 
information and consultation). Since 1993, RSUs have been able to negotiate at 
plant level on issues that are delegated from the industry-wide level.
However, despite these general agreements, RSUs are not universal. There are 
some sectors -including banking and insurance- where they are very rare. If RSUs 
have not been set up it is perfectly legal for previous systems of trade union repre-
sentation -which can vary from company to company, depending on the agreement 
signed- to continue, although this is also not common. However, whatever the form, 
it is trade unions that play the central role in workplace representation in Italy. 
Although RSUs are elected by the whole workforce, they remain primarily union 
committees.
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Another important element is the existence of joint committees, where company 
and employees are formally represented. They are intended to prepare the ground-
work for collective bargaining by providing technical support.
7.2  The Current Situation of Employee Representatives. 
What Do Employers Say? Conclusions of the 
Interviews
In this section we present the main results of the interviews with Human Resources 
(HR) managers on the profile of employee representatives in the company (ERs).
The Structure of Worker Representation In Italy, the unions have a single chan-
nel of representation of employees in the company. In addition, the minimum num-
ber of members of the RSU is established by the Collective Agreement. In general, 
HR managers believe that the number of members of the RSU is adequate. They 
also believe that joint committees, composed by company and employees repre-
sentatives, are essential for social dialogue, as they represent a place for discussion 
on topics which are then discussed at the negotiating table. They prevent and settle 
disputes between employers and employees.
Organizational and Contractual Innovation Several HR managers think that the 
representatives of the workers are scared of change, of innovation. The representa-
tives of some unions are less open to change than others, in particular, small unions 
(for example COBAS3) with whom it is more difficult to reach an agreement on the 
contractual innovations.
Competencies HR managers believe that a deep knowledge of the issues under 
discussion is crucial to the dialogue between the parties and achieving a good agree-
ment. They believe that ERs have good general skills although they lack a broader 
view of the problem, a vision of the socio-economic context in which the company 
operates.
ERs are very weak regarding competencies, especially in keeping up with the times, under-
standing the company strategy and market change (HR manager, Metal sector).
Time and In-Depth Analysis The time spent and deepening of topics under dis-
cussion are two fundamental elements to achieve a good agreement.
Any change needs to be prepared, discussed, and then we can confront each other easily; 
but at the beginning they [ERs], are always close to any change (HR manager. Energy 
sector).
3 The Confederazione dei Comitati di Base (COBAS) is a rank and file trade union. It was 
formed in the late 1980s by members who were dissatisfied with the leadership of the three main 
Italian confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL).
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Time seems a fundamental resource. Taking a deeper look in the issues takes time 
but it helps to reach agreements without strong conflicts.
Trust Generally, the relationship of trust between HR managers and ERs is quite 
high, above average. However, most of them make it clear that the relationship of 
trust is better with representatives of major trade unions, with which the exchange 
is continuous. Conversely, the relationship is more problematic with smaller unions, 
such as the COBAS, because they are more ideological.
Obviously, we are talking about the representatives of the central trade union confederations 
(CISL, UIL, CGIL), then there are COBAS [Rank-and-file committees], in this case trust 
falls rapidly…. (HR manager from the Bank Sector).
Industrial Relations Climate Managers perceive the climate of industrial rela-
tions in their company as good. The dialogue and cooperation seem to be the pre-
vailing elements in the confrontation between the parties. The following sentence is 
representative of the business climate in the negotiations:
The attitude of both parts to the dialogue and confrontation, the openness of the employee 
representatives was essential to come to an agreement. We don’t think there are other roads 
besides dialogue and confrontation (HR manager, Energy Industry).
Although in the metal industry where the FIOM has not signed the contract, the 
company climate is more confrontational:
At moment in the metalworking industry it is very difficult to dialogue with FIOM [Metal-
work trade union linked to CGIL] which did not sign the national collective agreement, so 
you can imagine what it means in a metalworking factory—where the majority is still from 
FIOM… last year I have really had an ‘annus horribilis’: They keep stuck the factory. The 
FIOM demanded the same labor rights despite not having signed the contract (HR manager, 
Metalworking industry).
Differences Among Sectors The main difference is between the private and pub-
lic sector. The Italian government reached an agreement with unions on the 4th of 
February of 2011 regarding productivity-linked pay increases in the public sector. 
The agreement also covered negotiations for a framework agreement on industrial 
relations in the public sector until 2012, as collective bargaining was frozen until 
then. Due to the financial intervention package in July 2010, the renewal of col-
lective agreements in the public sector was suspended from 2010 to 2012. The pay 
of the public sector workers was also frozen. At present, pay in the public sector is 
frozen as well as the employees’ turnover and the renewal of collective agreement.
It is evident that due to the limitations imposed by legislation, negotiating space 
in the public sector is very limited:
Due to the change in the regulatory framework the renewal of collective agreements, pay 
and turnover are frozen. At present, most of the controversies, 60 %, are request of change 
of the type of contract, from fixed term or seasonal to open-ended contract (HR manager, 
Transports’ sector).
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7.3  Perceptions of Employers on ERs. Results  
of the Survey
The results presented in Fig. 7.1 are based on a survey amongst 614 European HR 
managers from eleven different European countries. T tests were conducted to ana-
lyze differences between Italian and the rest of European HR managers participat-
ing in this study.
Figure 7.1 presents the results of the comparison between the Italian HR man-
agers and those of other eleven European countries. The significant differences 
in four variables have been circled. First, the variance of competences and atti-
tudes ( Diversity in competencies and attitude of ERs) among Italian ERs seems to 
be smaller than European ERs (M = 2.94 versus M = 3.38). The level of personal 
conflict and friction ( relationship conflict) between management and ERs in 
Italy (M = 2.01) seems to be lower than the average of other European countries 
(M = 2.29). However, Italian ERs during the conflict seem to be more cooperative 
( Cooperative conflict management by ERs) (M = 3.00) than the European aver-
age (M = 2.76). Finally, the cooperation of ERs for resolving conflicts seems to be 
reflected in the relative effectiveness ( Conflict management efficacy) with which 
management and ERs resolve conflicts in Italy (M = 3.35, versus M = 2.98).
The comparison between Italian and European ERs shows that Italian ERs are 
more cooperative during the conflicts, in spite of the level of personal conflict -on 
average higher than Europe-. This cooperative attitude leads to a more efficient 
resolution of conflicts.
ϭϮϯϰϱ ƵƌŽƉĞ/ƚĂůǇ
Fig. 7.1 Mean scores of main variables for Italian and European HR managers
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7.4  Suggestions Given by Employers to Improve Social 
Dialogue in Italy
The interviews reveal a certain capacity for dialogue between HR managers and 
ERs at company level, although in some cases there are some difficulties due to 
the lack of a broader vision by the ERs, extended to the context in which company 
operates and the opening to contractual and organizational innovations. In the lat-
ter case, the lack of openness is often related to the different positions expressed 
by unions. Both difficulties can be overcome through better training of ERs and 
through the deepening of arguments.
Training Several HR managers think that a wider knowledge beyond the strictly 
trade union issues would help to better understand the changes of the market and 
corporate strategies, and this could encourage social dialogue in the enterprise. 
Consequently, many managers think that a continuous update on issues such as the 
labor market, labor law, and international economics favor the dialogue between 
the parties.
I think it is much better for a company to have a proficient counterpart. Expert ERs who 
display a proactive behavior are also good for the company. In contrast, weak trade unions 
and ERs are more inclined to create conflicts and it doesn’t help neither trade unions nor 
company (HR manager, Transport sector).
Innovation Change can only happen if you are dealing with an open counterpart. 
Several managers think that a more careful selection of ERs would help. Trade 
unions should choose their candidates better, they should choose people with a 
natural inclination to cooperation and negotiation, open-minded and with a high 
level of proficiency.
Consistency and Informal Contact The relationship of trust between HR managers 
and ERs can be improved through consistency in behavior and informal contacts
These activities are mainly pertaining to the field of informal relationships, at the same 
time; trust is based on the achievement of concrete results. The achievement of concrete 
results feeds mutual trust (HR manager, Financial sector).
Another important element in building a relationship of trust between HR managers 
and ERs are the bilateral committees in which the comparison is made on specific 
issues and informally
Trust climate could be improved giving to ERs the chance to intervene on specific topic 
with their proposal, increasing their participation. Managers’ goodwill in this case is not 
enough; we need to write joint protocols establishing shared rules of play. We can talk 
about employee’s participation as much as we want but if there isn’t a [Joint] Committee 
(HR manager, Energy sector).
Decision Making Process HR managers believe that, in general, it is very difficult 
to involve trade unions in decisions on the strategies of the company. On the other 
hand they think that ERs must have a lot of influence in decision-making on the 
organization of work processes.
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7.5  Discussion and Expectations of Italian Employers  
on ERs’ Roles, Attitudes and Competences
The Italian system of industrial relations is characterized by a growing rate of 
decentralization, which opens space for cooperation among social actors at plant 
level. Decentralization is seen as mechanism to improve productivity. Productiv-
ity improvements are now only to be taken account in company level bargaining. 
Therefore, company-level bargaining open space for cooperation among employers 
and workplace trade unions on improving working conditions.
Qualitative interviews and surveys shows a high level of social dialogue at 
company level, even if there are some contradictions due to the different approach 
to industrial relations between trade unions confederation and rank and file trade 
unions.
There is a general opinion among Italian HR managers that there’s a need for 
more competent counterparts, less confrontational and more open to change. The 
ideological orientation that shapes the ERs’ profile in Italy, especially in the case 
of ERs who are members of small trade unions, is characterized by confrontation 
with management. In this regard, HR managers say it would be important to attract 
competent, younger and open-minded people for this role, and pay more attention 
to the selection process.
I would like to see the ERs being more aware of the overall context in which the bank 
operates, a greater understanding of how the labor market works, less prejudice against 
the employer, or ideological positions, when we sit at the negotiating table. In other words, 
more open to change and innovation (HR manager, Banking sector).
Training ERs is an aspect which is strictly linked to the previous one. Companies 
should invest more in the training of ERs because HR managers believe that compe-
tent ERs are more open to change and this would help a constructive social dialogue 
within the organization. However, in the perception of the HR managers training 
ERs is responsibility of the trade unions:
I would invest more on training because the more competent they are, the more ERs are 
able to read the situation and its importance. Currently, the company invests on the specific 
themes, such as workers safety. Trade unions have their training schools, which are very 
good (HR manager, Transports sector).
The company trains their employees through the Joint Committee. This Committee can also 
train ERs (HR manager, Energy sector).
ERs don’t receive any company support for improving their competencies. I mean a spe-
cific program for them. Trade Unions support their representatives through seminars (HR 
manager, Metal sector).
It is clear that companies do not see ERs training as their responsibility, even if they 
are aware of the importance of competent ERs for the quality of agreements and 
social dialogue.
Regarding the attitudes of ERs, HR managers would like ERs to have a higher 
degree of openness towards change and to be more independent of their trade 
unions. Particularly, they see that ERs who are members of small Trade Unions are 
closed to any organizational or contractual innovation.
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We find strong rigidity. This is due to various factors. Most of the time this rigidity is due 
to the political line of the trade unions of which ERs are members (HR manager, Banking 
sector).
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
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